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The political functions of expert knowledge:  
Knowledge and legitimation in European Union Immigration Policy 
 
Christina Boswell 
 
Abstract Most literature on knowledge utilization is premised on rationalist theories of 
organizations: bureaucracies draw on knowledge instrumentally, either to expand their power or 
to adjust policy output. This paper develops an alternative account of the functions of knowledge, 
arguing that organizations are just as likely to value knowledge as a source of legitimation, or as a 
way of substantiating their policy preferences. The prevalence of these different forms of 
knowledge utilization will depend on (a) features of the organization (its perceived stability and 
source of legitimation); and (b) features of the policy area (degree of contention and mode of 
settlement). The article applies this framework to explore the European Commission’s use of 
knowledge in immigration policy, especially through the European Migration Network.  
 
 
Key Words European Commission; expert knowledge; immigration policy; knowledge 
utilization; organizational sociology; technocracy. 
 
 
Forthcoming in: 
Journal of European Public Policy, 15:4 (May 2008), pp. 4721-488
 2 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Bureaucratic organizations are dependent on expert knowledge in a variety of ways.
1
 On 
the traditional Weberian account, bureaucracies are characterized by the rationality of 
their structures and action (Weber 1970: 220), implying a concern to ensure decisions are 
based on sound reasoning and empirical knowledge. Expert knowledge is thus valued in 
an instrumental sense, helping the organization to deliver its goals. But the Weberian 
account also implies a second, more symbolic function of expert knowledge: the use of 
knowledge as a means of legitimizing particular decisions, or legitimizing bureaucratic 
domination per se. On this account, knowledge signals the organization’s conformity to 
rational rules, underpinning the authority of policy-makers and their decisions. So in the 
first case, knowledge is valued for its instrumental role; in the second, it is valued 
symbolically, as a means of demonstrating the credibility of the organization or its 
decisions.  
Despite a huge expansion of literature on knowledge utilization from the mid- 
1970s onwards, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the symbolic functions of 
knowledge. To be sure, a number of scholars have observed that expert knowledge may 
be used strategically, as ‘ammunition’ for substantiating organizational preferences 
(Weiss 1986; Sabatier 1978; Majone 1989; Radaelli 1995). Moreover, contributions in 
organizational sociology have shown how organizations derive legitimacy through 
signalling their commitment to knowledge utilization (Feldman and March 1981; March 
1994). However, there has been little attempt to develop a theory setting out the 
conditions under which symbolic knowledge utilization may be expected to occur, or 
testing these claims through empirical enquiry.  This lacuna seems to be especially 
regrettable for studies of European Union policy-making. It has been argued that EU 
policy is predominantly regulatory and technocratic, and that its civil service appears to 
derive legitimacy from its expertise (Majone 1996; Radaelli 1999). But the absence of a 
more rigorous theory of the symbolic functions of knowledge has made it difficult to 
elaborate or test these claims systematically. 
This paper takes a first step towards addressing this deficit, sketching the contours 
of a theory of the different functions of expert knowledge in (bureaucratic) policy-
making. It argues that in addition to its instrumental function, expert knowledge can play 
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two alternative, symbolic, functions. The first of these is a legitimizing function. By being 
seen to draw on expert knowledge, an organization can enhance its legitimacy and bolster 
its claim to resources or jurisdiction over particular policy areas. In this sense knowledge 
can endow organizations with ‘epistemic authority’ (Herbst 2003: 484). The second is a 
substantiating function. Expert knowledge can lend authority to particular policy 
positions, helping to substantiate organizational preferences in cases of political 
contestation. The paper sets out the conditions under which organizations are likely to 
draw on knowledge to perform these instrumental, legitimizing and substantiating 
functions (section 2). Section 3 explores how this theory applies to the case of policy-
making on immigration and asylum in the European Commission. I argue that the 
institutional structure of the Commission, and certain features of this policy area, imply a 
strong propensity to value knowledge as a source of legitimation and substantiation. In 
the final section I explore how far these expectations are met through a more detailed 
examination of the case of the European Migration Network (EMN). 
A brief word about the choice of case study. The Commission Directorate-
General Justice, Liberty and Security (DG JLS) is in many ways an unusual example of a 
bureaucratic organization, relatively abstracted from the societal impacts of its policies, 
and engaged in a constant struggle for legitimacy. These features make it especially likely 
to set store by the symbolic functions of knowledge. Immigration and asylum, 
meanwhile, is a highly contested policy area characterized by epistemic uncertainty, 
offering considerable scope to deploy knowledge to substantiate policy preferences. So 
both the organization and the policy area stack the probabilities in favour of symbolic 
knowledge utilization. As such, it is not intended to offer a typical case, or to test the 
theory in a rigorous way. Rather, it provides a good illustration of the possibility of the 
symbolic functions of knowledge, and may be treated as a first ‘plausibility probe’ of this 
theory of the functions of knowledge.  
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2. KNOWLEDGE UTILIZATION: INSTRUMENTAL, LEGITIMIZING OR 
SUBSTANTIATING? 
 
Hypotheses 
Any account of how organizations use knowledge will inevitably be premised on a theory 
of organizations: a set of claims about the sources and nature of organizational interests, 
and how these translate into organizational action. Most theories of knowledge utilization 
adopt rational choice accounts, which assume that organizations are essentially interested 
in maximizing power (Sabatier 1978; Pfeffer 1981), or realizing mandated goals (Weiss 
1978; Rich and Oh 1994). My account follows what can be termed an organizational 
institutionalist approach (DiMaggio and Powell 1991a). Its core premise is that 
administrative agencies are fundamentally concerned to secure legitimacy, in the sense of 
meeting societal expectations about appropriate structures, practices, rhetoric or output 
(Scott 1991: 169). Organizations are keen to secure both internal legitimacy from their 
members, whose loyalty is critical for organizational reproduction (Brunsson 1985: 18-
21). And they need to secure external legitimacy from their environment, whether this 
consists of the political system, organized interests or consumers. Contrary to standard 
rational choice approaches, this quest for legitimacy should not be understood in terms of 
a rationalistic logic of maximizing performance, or expanding power. Members of 
organizations are concerned with reducing uncertainty and stabilizing social relations 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991a: 19; Scott 1995: 21; Weick 1995: 86-7). They establish 
shared norms, beliefs and practices that help to provide stability through rendering 
patterns of behaviour more predictable, and offering a cognitive map for making sense of 
the organization and its environment (DiMaggio and Powell 1991a). As a result, there is 
often a substantial divergence between an organization’s ascribed mandate and goals (its 
formal structure), and the norms, beliefs and practices that guide the actions of members 
(its informal structure) (Meyer and Rowan 1991: 57-8). 
 This account implies the need for caution about inferring any reliable link 
between objective features of the organization and its environment, and its interests and 
actions. However, one can posit a number of general conditions that influence 
organizational strategies for enhancing legitimacy. For a start, an organization is more 
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likely to seek legitimacy where it perceives itself to be operating in an unstable 
environment: uncertainty about its survival, or about the distribution of resources 
between itself and rival agencies (DiMaggio and Powell 1991a: 30-31).  
Secondly, strategies for securing legitimacy will vary according to the type of 
organization involved. Here it is useful to distinguish between two ideal typical 
organizations: the action organization and the political organization (Brunsson 2002). 
Action organizations derive legitimacy from their output, or, in the case of administrative 
agencies, the impact of their societal interventions. By contrast, political organizations 
derive legitimacy from what Brunsson calls ‘talk’ and ‘decisions’. Legitimation through 
‘talk’ implies espousing certain norms and values in the organization’s formal structure 
and its rhetoric. Legitimation through ‘decisions’ implies being seen to take action to 
respond to issues that have been framed as requiring political action. Put simply, we can 
assume that action organizations are more likely to use knowledge instrumentally, 
drawing on research to improve the quality of their output. This will occur where the 
organization recognizes there are knowledge gaps that hinder its performance. By 
contrast, political organizations are likely to use expert knowledge to signal their 
legitimacy. Where actors in the environment set store by expert knowledge, they will be 
keen to demonstrate a commitment to research.  
 If action organizations are likely to use knowledge instrumentally and political 
organizations use it as a source of legitimation, under what conditions will knowledge be 
valued as a means of substantiating policy positions? In fact, both action and political 
organizations may use knowledge to substantiate their preferences. The key variables 
influencing this type of knowledge utilization revolve around two features of the policy 
area. The first is the degree of contestation over policy. Organizations facing opposition 
to their policy preferences may find it expedient to draw on additional resources to lend 
credibility to their views. The second feature is what can be termed the mode of 
settlement considered appropriate for adjudicating between rival claims: technocratic or 
democratic (Boswell 2008). Technocratic modes of settlement prevail when scientific 
evidence and analysis are accepted as legitimate criteria for adjudicating preferences. By 
contrast, democratic modes prevail in policy areas in which popular support is considered 
decisive. Typically, these are areas in which conflict revolves around differences of 
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values or interests, rather than competing knowledge claims (Radaelli 1999). Knowledge 
is likely to be deployed by an organization to substantiate its preferences in instances 
where a technocratic mode prevails. 
 It is worth noting that all three types of knowledge utilization may involve quite 
calculated strategies for enhancing the organization’s output, advancing its preferences, 
or bolstering its legitimacy. However, this does not imply embracing a rational choice 
conception of organizational action. The perception that knowledge utilization will yield 
a certain outcome, and that this outcome is desirable, are shaped by the organization’s 
cognitive frame. Moreover, the symbolic use of knowledge need not involve a reflected 
calculation, but may emerge as a taken-for-granted procedure that conforms to deeply 
ingrained ideas about appropriate action (March 1988: 8).   
These hypotheses are summarised in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1  Hypotheses on the Functions of Knowledge 
Function of 
Knowledge 
Instrumental  
 
Legitimizing  Substantiating  
Features of 
organization 
Unstable organizational 
field 
Unstable organizational 
field 
Unstable organizational 
field 
Action organization  
 
Political organization --- 
Features of policy 
area 
--- --- Contested policy area 
Organization recognizes 
epistemic uncertainty 
Policy community 
recognizes epistemic 
uncertainty 
Contestants accept 
technocratic mode of 
settlement 
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Indicators 
Table 1 makes clear that there is some overlap between the conditions likely to prompt 
these different uses of knowledge. In particular, all three types of knowledge utilization 
are correlated with unstable organizational fields, and recognized gaps in knowledge.
2
 
This makes it difficult to test these claims, suggesting the need for indicators setting out 
the sorts of features we would expect to observe for each type of knowledge utilization.  
 First, where knowledge is being used instrumentally, we would expect the 
structure and procedures for utilizing research to be closely coupled to the organization’s 
output needs. The organization will aim to ensure that research provides knowledge that 
helps meet performance targets. This will not necessarily be the case with legitimizing 
knowledge, where research structures and procedures will be influenced by the policy 
community’s perceptions of appropriate arrangements rather than by the requirements of 
enhancing the quality of output. In the case of substantiating knowledge, one would 
expect a structure that enables knowledge users to select and draw on research according 
to their interest in justifying particular claims.  
 Second, in the case of instrumental knowledge, we would expect the research 
agenda to focus on areas in which the organization is keen to adjust its output, and for 
there to be mechanisms in place for knowledge transfer to relevant policy makers. This 
contrasts with the case of legitimizing knowledge, where policy makers will be less 
involved in selecting research topics or digesting findings. In the case of substantiating 
knowledge, one would expect senior officials to be interested in selecting topics and 
using findings that substantiated their policy preferences, but not in detailed aspects of 
the findings or methodology. 
 The third indicator concerns publicity of knowledge utilization. Where an 
organization is using knowledge as a source of legitimation, it will be keen to make its 
use of knowledge explicit to actors in its environment. This will not be the case for 
instrumental utilization, where the organization will in principle be indifferent as to 
whether its use of knowledge is being observed or not. Where knowledge plays a 
substantiating function, research will be publicized selectively according to its potential 
to justify policy preferences. 
 These indicators are summarized in Table 2. 
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Table 2   Indicators of Types of Knowledge Utilization 
Instrumental Knowledge Legitimising Knowledge Substantiating Knowledge 
1.  Organizational structure and 
substance of research reflect 
performance targets 
1. Looser fit between 
structure/substance of research 
and policy goals 
1. Structure and substance of 
research reflect lines of 
contention 
2. Intensive interest in and take-up 
of research by decision-makers 
2. Looser ties between decision-
makers and research unit 
2. Some exchange between 
decision-makers and research unit 
3. No obvious interest in 
publicising knowledge utilization 
3. Clear interest in widely 
publicizing knowledge 
utilization 
3. Selected interest in publicizing 
utilization (to relevant policy-
makers) 
 
 
3.  THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND THE FUNCTIONS OF KNOWLEDGE  
I would like to apply this framework to the case of the European Commission’s role in 
immigration and asylum policy. This will enable us to generate more precise 
expectations, which can then be tested on a specific instance of knowledge utilization, 
that of the EMN.  
Before beginning, it is worth clarifying the concept of ‘organization’ and its 
application to the Commission. Sociological approaches tend to delineate organizational 
boundaries in terms of an organization’s shared culture or ideology (Shore 2000; Cini 
1995; Beyer 1981; Brunsson 1985). Following this approach, the Commission may be 
best characterized as a multi-organization (Cram 1994; Hooghe 1997), whose 
Directorates display pronounced differences in terms of their ideologies, organizational 
cultures and policy styles (Cini 1995), as well as their ways of ‘framing’ issues (Mörth 
2000; Surel 2000). Nonetheless, there are also a number of structural-institutional and 
ideational features that are shared across Directorates. The analysis that follows will 
therefore focus on the particular case of the Directorate JLS, but many of the points may 
be more generally applicable to the Commission as a whole. 
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The quest for legitimacy 
One important feature of the European Commission is its relatively fragile basis of 
legitimation (Horeth 1999: 254). It is not headed by elected representatives, nor is it 
tasked with implementing a democratically mandated programme. Although many areas 
of EU cooperation are by now well-entrenched, in a number of policy areas – including 
JLS – the Commission’s role is continually being questioned, and its activities subject to 
demands for justification. This implies that DG JLS is operating in an unstable 
organizational field, and constantly striving to enhance its legitimacy.  
 Much of this insecurity derives from inter-departmental wrangles, including 
battles over jurisdiction with DG Employment and Social Affairs (Interviews, June 
2006). There have also been tensions with DGs External Relations and Development, 
exacerbated by the complexity of cross-pillar arrangements on the ‘external dimension’ 
of JLS (Boswell, 2002). The Directorate also has good reason to feel insecure about its 
external environment. In addition to the typical rivalries with the Council and concern to 
enlist the support of the Parliament, JLS is engaged in a continuous struggle for 
competence with member states. Immigration and asylum is a highly sensitive area of 
cooperation, with many governments resisting the development of common policies. 
While there has been considerable Europeanization in this area over the past decade, the 
Commission has also faced numerous set-backs, seeing various proposals rejected or 
substantially watered down. These uncertainties make the Directorate likely to draw on 
resources that will enhance the legitimacy of its remit. 
 
The Commission as a political organization 
Much of the literature on the Commission has stressed the importance of its image as a 
technocratic agency, whose actions are based on rationalistic decision-making procedures 
and the use of expertise. Some scholars link this to the Commission’s role as mediator or 
‘honest broker’ between member states and EU institutions (Hooghe and Nugent 2006: 
153; Cini 1996: 30). The Commission is keen to present itself as having privileged access 
to data, enabling it to get the sort of cross-national comparative perspective that is 
unavailable to national governments. Access to this type of knowledge also allows the 
Commission to identify areas that arguably require Union-level regulation (Stevens 2001: 
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139; Cram 1994: 211). Other scholars have traced the Commission’s technocratic 
character to the structure of policy-making, which implies a key role for interest groups, 
labour and industry, and national officials (Richardson 1995). In addition, the 
preponderance of regulatory, rather than distributive, policy at EU level implies a 
dependence on expert knowledge rather than material resources (Majone 1996; Radaelli 
1999).    
 This reliance on technocratic competence becomes more explicable if we consider 
the Commission’s distance from the societal impacts of its policy interventions, 
especially in a policy area like immigration and asylum. Through their involvement in 
implementation and delivery, national interior ministries have multiple channels of 
feedback and intelligence about the impacts of their interventions. Crucially, such 
impacts also become the object of party political debate and mass media scrutiny. This 
contrasts with DG JLS, which has a proscribed role in implementation, and is not 
generally held accountable by national media. This contributes to the Directorate’s 
distance from the societal impacts of its actions, and its lack of direct accountability. 
 All of this has two implications. First, the Directorate perceives itself to be judged 
on its talk and decisions, rather than its performance. It is an almost paradigmatic case of 
a political organization. It invests far more energy in securing support for its proposals 
than on following up or trying to adjust their societal impact.
3
 Second, this abstraction 
from societal impacts has practical implications for the Directorate’s sources of 
knowledge. Rather than receiving direct feedback on the impacts of its policies through 
affected groups, JLS tends to rely on the collection of data on socio-economic indicators, 
or comparative analysis of national legislation. Its sources of social knowledge are thus 
far more abstract and actively structured than those of national bureaucracies.  
 DG JLS is therefore reliant on specialized knowledge to legitimize its role in this 
policy area. It has more work to do justifying its role through its expertise, since it cannot 
secure credibility through its impact. And it is obliged to rely on abstract knowledge, 
since it has limited opportunities to observe societal processes through praxis.  
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Knowledge as a source of legitimation in the migration policy community 
The Commission is especially likely to use knowledge to boost its legitimacy where the 
policy community recognizes the importance of expert knowledge in underpinning 
decisions. Where this is the case, it may trigger mimetic isomorphism: the imitation of 
styles in knowledge utilization observed in the organization’s environment (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1991b: 69). The Brussels-based immigration and asylum policy community 
includes an array of international organizations, lobby groups and think tanks. Many of 
the larger organizations have dedicated research departments or ‘research officers’. DG 
JLS officials are increasingly active in a variety of fora bringing together these actors. 
They regularly participate in conferences and workshops, have frequent meetings with 
researchers, sit on advisory boards for research programmes, and publish academic 
articles. Thus officials are continually exposed to situations in which they are expected to 
demonstrate expertise on migration issues. A senior official eloquently conveys this, in 
describing their experience on first joining the DG.  
I remember I went to a big meeting just after I’d joined in the year 2000, and everybody in 
integration – all the people in integration, all the key academics – were there. And of course I 
didn’t know this – I didn’t know any of them. But nevertheless you immediately and quickly 
begin to identify the leaders in this whole field, and since then I’ve got to know most of them, 
and you can get into the network very quickly ... so gradually you build up your knowledge 
and you network yourself so that you get to know what’s going on (Interview, June 2006). 
Such interactions place officials under pressure to keep abreast of research, in order to 
secure the respect of the policy community.  
 
A contested policy area 
The features outlined above make the Commission likely to use knowledge as a source of 
legitimation. But we can also point to a number of factors that indicate the usefulness of 
knowledge as a means of substantiating policy preferences. Chief among these is the fact 
that immigration and asylum policy is a highly contested policy area, with considerable 
divergence of views between member states and EU institutions. Within these debates, 
DG JLS has a distinctive set of beliefs and norms, which can be broadly characterised as 
liberal, human rights and free market oriented. These preferences are consistently 
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articulated in the Directorate’s communications, legislative proposals, and in the rhetoric 
of officials. 
 Policy positions premised on a commitment to international human rights law or 
liberal economic reasoning are well suited to technocratic modes of justification. They 
imply the need to ground policies in more rational and universalistic principles, which 
transcend populist or nationalistic perspectives. Such technocratic modes of justification, 
moreover, are highly appropriate given the particular institutional status of the 
Commission. The organization can portray itself as uniquely abstracted from immediate 
political exigencies, adopting a longer-term, impartial perspective.  
 There is a second way in which knowledge utilization may help promote the 
Commission’s policy preferences. It has been argued that where the Commission fails to 
secure political agreement on a proposal, it frequently employs a strategy of ‘softening 
up’ (Majone 1992: 6). It puts the proposal on hold, biding its time, but continuing to 
devote attention to technical and procedural aspects of the policy (Cini 1996: 31). For 
example, it may continue to gather evidence supporting its claims, or establish a 
procedure for monitoring national developments. Over time these procedures become 
institutionalized, and national governments become accustomed to the idea of 
cooperation in the given area (Cram 1997: 38). It may well be that this form of softening 
up characterizes the Commission’s use of bodies such as the EMN. The very process of 
debating the Network’s research agenda may normalize the idea of cooperation. This is a 
rather different notion of the substantiating function of knowledge. It implies that the 
very process of producing expert knowledge – rather than the research findings 
themselves – bolsters the Commission’s policy preferences.  
 
In sum, DG JLS displays characteristics making it likely to use knowledge symbolically. 
The Directorate is operating in an unstable environment, prompting it to find ways of 
enhancing its legitimacy. It is likely to do this through its talk and decisions, rather than 
actions, implying a propensity to draw on knowledge as a source of legitimation. The 
need to be seen to draw on expert knowledge is particularly pronounced in the area of 
immigration and asylum, where there is intensive interaction with the research 
community. Moreover, this is a highly contested area in which the Directorate has a 
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distinctive ideological agenda, making it likely that the Directorate will draw on 
knowledge as a means of substantiating its preferred policy choices. Finally, JLS’ 
ideological preferences lend themselves to technocratic rather than democratic forms of 
justification, again implying that knowledge may play a substantiating function. 
 
 
4.  EVIDENCE 
It is difficult to ‘test’ these propositions in any rigorous way. However, we can try to 
gauge the functions of knowledge through observing patterns of research utilization along 
the indicators set out in Table 2. I have chosen to focus on the example of the EMN, 
established by DG JLS in 2002. The Directorates’s stated rationale for this Network was 
instrumental: it would supply research and data on immigration and asylum, to improve 
the quality of EU policies. In this section, I will consider how far the Network’s mandate 
and structure, its research output, and its dissemination strategies, confirm this 
instrumental function. The findings are based on nine semi-structured interviews with 
Commission and national officials involved in the EMN; a questionnaire filled out by 10 
JLS officials; observation of three EMN meetings; and analysis of Commission and EMN 
documents. 
 
Mandate and structure of the EMN 
At the outset, the Commission had no clear preference concerning the mandate and 
structure of the EMN. The Network was tasked with the broad goal of ‘setting up a 
systematic basis for monitoring the multidimensional phenomena of migration and 
asylum in the EU, by covering the legal, demographic, economic, social and political 
aspects, and in identifying associated underlying causes.’ (EMN web-site). As one 
official describes the mandate: 
In a way it was deliberately very broad, because particularly at the early stage one wasn’t 
exactly sure how it would evolve, and you couldn’t say, right, you’re going to concentrate on 
this. Also because you didn’t really know the expertise of the national contact points. So I 
think the whole thing was deliberately broad. (Interview, September 2006) 
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This lack of design casts doubt on the prevalence of an instrumental function of 
knowledge, instead implying that the Network was valued as a source of legitimation. 
Although they continually stressed the need for more knowledge, JLS officials were 
clearly under pressure to meet the expectations set up by the Laeken European Council, 
which had called for the establishment of the EMN. In this sense it represents a case of 
coercive isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1991b), whereby the Commission felt 
compelled to adopt the trappings of a research competence because of expectations set up 
by its environment.  
The Directorate displayed stronger preferences when it came to the structure of the 
Network. Initially, it had favoured a network of independent and well-reputed researchers 
led by a ‘scientific coordinator’, with the Commission merely funding the meetings. This 
reflected an interest in signalling the scientific credentials of the Network, again implying 
a concern with organizational legitimacy. 
For a number of reasons, this model proved unworkable. Interior ministries wanted 
to select their own national contact point, and in most cases preferred this to be a 
government official. They were keen to retain control over the collection and exchange of 
information on such a sensitive topic. Moreover, the Commission realized there were 
certain drawbacks to relying on independent experts. This is how one senior official 
describes the reasoning: 
Initially we started in this rather naïve way, believing that by involving mainly research and 
scientific institutes you could create something like an objective view of migration, which is 
– forgive me my clear works – utter nonsense. Because whatever you say, whatever you do, 
it will be politically instrumentalized by one side or the other, for whatever purposes. So in 
the end we realized, whatever this network does, in whatever way it is composed, the 
Commission will be responsible for it. (Interview, September 2006) 
In other words, the Commission became aware of the impossibility of deliberating these 
issues in a purely technocratic mode, to be settled through evidence and rational 
argumentation. The structure that emerged instead was an inter-governmental network, 
composed predominantly of officials, and coordinated by the Commission.  
Not only did the structure of the Network change after 2002, but its goals were also 
increasingly crystallized in terms of an instrumental function. This can be attributed 
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partly to a process of trial and error, which enabled the Commission to become clearer 
about what the Network could and could not deliver. As one official put it:  
I think what is coming out more, and if you like, in terms of the EMN finding its niche, is 
this idea of it being much more to support policy and decision-making. (Interview, 
September 2006).   
This new focus gained the approval of member states in the context of a consultation on 
the future of the EMN, carried out in the first half of 2006. Reflecting the new consensus, 
the Commission became increasingly committed to the idea that the Network’s work 
should feed into Union policy-making.  
One can therefore discern a quite marked evolution in the Commission’s 
reasoning. The initial preoccupation with the Network’s legitimacy gradually shifted to 
an emphasis on the instrumental function of knowledge. It remains to be established if 
this instrumental function was realized in practice, or whether it was instead a form of 
rhetoric adopted to enhance the credibility of the new structure. This should become 
clearer by considering patterns of research production and utilization. 
 
Research agenda and research utilization 
As with the Network’s mandate and structure, it was only from around 2004-5 onwards 
that the Commission started to develop a clear idea about what sorts of studies to select. 
The topic for the first major study was widely considered to have been, as one official put 
it, ‘an unfortunate choice’. The study dealt with the highly complex question of ‘The 
Impact of Immigration on Europe’s Societies’. It soon became clear that the project was 
far too ambitious. The quality of national reports diverged substantially, and many failed 
to meet the deadline. The summary prepared by the ‘scientific coordinator’ proved highly 
controversial, prompting the Commission to cancel a planned launch of the study in 
Summer 2005. The report came out in March 2006, after substantial editing. As one 
Commission official observed: 
This was such an unfortunate choice for the first study. I mean, this could have been the 
crowning work after several years of developing this network. Instead, we started with the 
most controversial and difficult and complex issue … this could not but end in disaster, as it 
did. (Interview, September 2006) 
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 Subsequent studies were more tightly defined, and generally geared towards 
providing information relevant to up-coming decisions. Interestingly, though, a number 
of these were produced too late to feed in to policy debates. Thus a study on voluntary 
return was expected to be concluded in November 2006, several months too late to 
inform Council discussions on the issue. Likewise a study on asylum reception systems 
was published in May 2006, once the relevant Directive was already in force. This 
implies a general aspiration to produce policy-relevant research, but insufficient 
coordination with policy-makers. 
Other studies have been more carefully timed to coincide with policy 
deliberations. Thus a study on illegal migration is scheduled to be completed prior to the 
Commission’s Communication on this topic, planned for July 2007. The third small-scale 
study on highly-skilled workers should be ready in time for a proposed Directive on the 
rights and responsibilities of migrant workers in the EU. Discussions on the work 
programme for 2007 place a premium on relevance for planned Commission proposals 
and communications.  
Priority is also given to studies that will help substantiate the Commission’s 
policy preferences. Clear examples of this are the studies on migrants in the health sector, 
and on highly-skilled workers. Indeed, the selection of these studies suggests a 
‘softening-up’ strategy. Both issues are highly sensitive, and/or discussion on the area has 
been blocked at the level of the Council of Ministers. As a senior Commission official 
observed of the study on the health sector: 
It’s one of these very, very delicate issues that for the moment we’d rather steer clear of, I’d 
have to say, and this is just a little bit of information gathering. It’s an issue that’s totally 
explosive, and you have to be so clear about the facts, what you’re doing, and how you 
present it. (Interview, June 2006) 
The Commission hopes that discussion of this issue in the Network could help indicate 
where the problems lie. 
Each member state knows what’s going on in its country, and what is particularly sensitive 
in its own country … So it’s a very good antennae because we see as much as we can from 
here and we try and keep in touch as much as we can. (Interview, June 2006) 
Probably the most telling indicator of the functions of the Network is the use of its 
studies by policy-makers. There appears to be a disjuncture between the professed goals 
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of the Network, and take-up of its research by Directorate staff. Apart from the handful of 
officials directly involved in the coordination of the EMN, few staff are aware of its 
studies. Instead, they continue to draw on a range of other sources to provide input into 
policy proposals and draft legislation. As an official commented, ‘I haven’t discussed it 
[the Network] with colleagues since I’ve been here, no-one’s really mentioned it’. 
Instead, the official concerned preferred to derive information from existing studies 
produced by research institutes, or through attending conferences. The disjuncture 
suggests that the Network’s research agenda may not be targeted primarily at meeting the 
information needs of Commission officials.  
 Not surprisingly, this contrasts with the opinions of officials involved in running 
the Network, who emphasize the supposed instrumental function of the EMN. They are 
concerned to portray the Network as contributing to policy development, presumably to 
lend it legitimacy. Senior officials involved in strategic planning, on the other hand, show 
more interested in the Network’s potential to substantiate Commission preferences, 
whether by softening up governments, or through producing research that supports the 
case for policy harmonization. So there is a clear discrepancy between the functions of 
knowledge for different parts of the organization.  
 
Dissemination and publicity   
The Commission has consistently emphasized the importance of publicizing the work of 
the Network, though the rationale for dissemination has not always been evident. One 
clear priority has been to publicize information on the Network to officials in other 
European institutions. This was particularly pronounced in the run-up to negotiations in 
2007 on the legal basis of the Network, with the Commission keen to publicize the 
EMN’s activities to senior policy-makers in the Council and the Parliament. A planned 
conference in 2007 was seen as an opportunity to ‘sell’ the Network to policy-makers 
(EMN Meeting, September 2006). One official summarised the concern this way: 
The more studies the EMN produces the more it becomes visible, and the more it’s growing, 
and the more visible you become the more people are interested in what you’re doing. They 
show up, they enquire what you are doing. And this is why we are advocating, also by means 
of conferences and by means of nice shiny looking brochures which we produce at our own 
cost, at the Commission’s cost, in high numbers, that the first reports get the necessary 
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circulation and spread. So we send them with letters from the Director General to MEPs, 
chairmen of committees who are concerned, the Commission, Member States, NGOs, and so 
this is the kind of advocating and promoting of this network – in order to increase its 
visibility. (Interview, September 2006) 
 The Commission has also encouraged national contact points to organize 
meetings to publicize work to researchers and ‘stakeholders’ within each participating 
country. The idea is to ‘ensure a representative range of institutions, organizations and 
initiatives at Member State level, which would allow the voices of all relevant 
stakeholders to be heard’ (EMN Work Programme 2007, MIGRAPOL Doc 105). But it is 
unclear how this concern to involve stakeholders furthers the professed instrumental 
goals of the Network. The most plausible explanation is that the Commission is 
embracing modish ideas about the need to involve stakeholders as a means of enhancing 
its legitimacy.  
 It is difficult to derive cut and dried conclusions from this pattern of 
dissemination. One can detect a relative emphasis on disseminating information about the 
Network, especially to researchers and senior policy-makers in EU institutions. This was 
in part a strategy to consolidate the position of the Network. There was also some 
concern to demonstrate that the structure and activities of the EMN conformed to 
expectations about appropriate patterns of knowledge utilization, especially in terms of 
the political relevance of its output, and its inclusive, consultative approach to research. 
Both sets of concern indicate an interest in the legitimizing function of the Network. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
DG JLS is a political organization par excellence, deriving its legitimacy from talk and 
decisions rather than action. As such, the expectation was that it would draw on 
knowledge primarily to enhance its legitimacy, rather than to improve its performance. 
Given the contested nature of EU immigration and asylum policy, it was also to be 
expected that research would be valued as a means of substantiating its policies. 
  The case of the EMN generally supports these expectations, but it also suggests 
the need to nuance the account in a number of ways. In the early stages of the EMN’s 
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development the Commission lacked a clear strategy, implying it had little interest in the 
Network playing either an instrumental or a substantiating function. This is borne out by 
the relative lack of interest in the Network on the part of JLS officials working on policy. 
Instead, the concern was to build up a Network that would be viewed as scientifically 
reputable and politically independent. The predominant function of the Network appears 
to have been that of bestowing legitimacy. 
  However, Commission thinking on the Network underwent quite a pronounced 
shift between 2004-2005. First, the experience of the initial phase made it clear that the 
structure and work programme of the Network would have to be reconsidered. The 
Network’s activities were deemed too politically sensitive for it to be composed of 
independent researchers, and teething pains with the first studies encouraged the 
Commission to think more strategically about how to select topics. This led to the 
prioritization of a more instrumental function for the Network, at least in the 
Commission’s rhetoric. But second, and just as important, it became clear that this new 
structure had potential to play a substantiating function. The involvement of national 
governments in producing studies could help normalize debate on controversial policy 
issues, and make them more likely to endorse the findings. So the Commission 
demonstrated considerable flexibility, able to exploit new possibilities for producing 
substantiating knowledge. 
 The analysis also pointed to a divergence between the views of officials depending 
on their organizational role. Senior management were interested in the substantiating 
function of the Network; while those actively involved in the Network continued to set 
store by its supposedly instrumental function. They were keen to propagate the view that 
it was feeding into policy-making, though this was not borne out by the experience of 
their colleagues working on policy. Their concern was to legitimize the EMN through 
claiming an instrumental role for the Network, although this goal remained largely 
aspirational. 
 The findings have wider implications for the theory of knowledge utilization, as well 
as for EU studies. In theoretical terms, they suggest that it is possible for different parts of 
an organization to nurture quite divergent beliefs about the functions of knowledge, 
contingent on their organizational role. They also suggest that organizations do not 
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necessarily have a fixed or even reflected strategy of knowledge utilization. Instead, ideas 
about the functions of knowledge can become crystallized or change over time, through a 
rather erratic process of trial and error.  
  From the perspective of EU studies, the case offers a good illustration of how a 
Commission DG has drawn on expert knowledge to bolster its credibility and help pursue 
its policy goals.  Clearly, DG JLS is working in a particularly sensitive area, and is still 
struggling to assert its authority. It may be that DGs with a less contested remit and/or 
whose societal impacts are more tangible set greater store in the instrumental functions of 
research. It would also be instructive to compare the Commission’s style of knowledge 
utilization with that of bureaucracies at national level. One would expect national 
governments to show a greater interest in the instrumental functions of knowledge, 
especially in areas where policy impacts are subject to intensive public scrutiny. That 
said, my surmise is that these symbolic functions are likely to pervade knowledge 
utilization in most administrative departments, a sobering thought for those engaged in 
policy research. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Expert knowledge refers to the product of research, i.e. of ‘a codified, scholarly and 
professional mode of knowledge production that has its prime institutional loci in 
universities, policy analysis units of government department or international 
organizations and private research institutes and produced by academics, think tank 
experts and [policy] professionals.’ (Stone 2002: 2).  
2
 Strictly speaking the table should contain a fourth column representing the case of non-
utilization of knowledge, which could be associated with a stable organizational field and 
no recognized knowledge gaps.  
3
 This should be contrasted with the view of Horeth (1999), who emphasizes the 
important of output as a source of legitimation for the Commission. However, it is worth 
noting that much of what Horeth defines as ‘output’ would fall within Brunsson’s 
categories of ‘talk’ or ‘decisions’ (Brunsson 2002).  
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